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Abstract
The starting point of this paper is a controversy that has involved the philosopher and 
educator John Dewey (1859-1952) since the last century: both authors contrary and 
favorable to his theses consider his educational conceptions associated with skepticism, 
a philosophical movement created by Pirro de Élis (360-270 BC). This controversy is 
investigated in this paper through the rhetorical analysis proposed by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, comparing Dewey’s discourse with the pyrrhonic formulations. This 
investigation results in the discovery of some similarities and an important difference 
between the discourses examined. This difference, in turn, leads to the examination of a 
philosophical movement prior to Pyrrhonism, the sophistry, with Protagoras of Abdera 
(490-421 B.C.) as its main representative. Sophistry is analyzed in this work according 
to contemporary authors who diverge from the traditional characterization instituted by 
Plato. The conclusions identify important coincidences between the Deweyan discourse 
and the Sophistic discourse, which allows Dewey to be associated with the rhetorical 
discursive tradition and to position his educational proposals within the scope of rhetorical 
pedagogy. This pedagogy proposes to lead students to compose and express their personal 
inclinations, not in the narrow space of individual life, but in the broader horizon of 
the community, through methods that aim to project the student in the public space of 
deliberation and action.
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Introduction
Our starting point is a controversy that began in the last century and is still 
present today: between favorable and unfavorable evaluations, John Dewey’s (1859-
1952) educational conceptions are characterized by some analysts as skeptical. The first 
section of this work will be dedicated to exposing this debate, while the second will 
seek to examine the consistency of the referred characterization, analyzing one of the 
philosopher’s most important works, The quest for certainty (DEWEY, 1929).
The following section will make a comparative study of Dewey with the formulations 
of the creator of skepticism, Pirro of Elis (360-270 B.C.), as recorded by Timon of Phlius 
(325-235 B.C.) and consolidated in the work Pyrrhonian hypotyposes, by Sextus Empiricus 
(1997), a thinker who lived between the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Christian era and is 
considered an essential reference for the study of this area.
To examine the feasibility of classifying Deweyan ideas as belonging - or at least 
similar - to Pyrrhonian skepticism, we will use the resources of rhetorical analysis, a 
methodology derived from Perelman’s work (PERELMAN, 1982; PERELMAN, 1999; 
PERELMAN; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, 2002), one of the most prominent representatives of 
the contemporary movement to review Aristotle’s work (BERTI, 1997; MAZZOTTI, 2007).
This methodology allows investigating printed discourses as argumentative pieces 
that aim to order the audience’s reasoning with a view to persuasion, a major objective of 
rhetoric. The discursive strategies of a given author can be compared to others, without 
resorting to ideological or moral judgments. In this paper, we will approach notional 
dissociation, an argumentation technique that establishes hierarchies between concepts, 
expressing a view of the world through criteria of interpretation and structuring of the 
real. The discourse articulated in such way begins with the formation of antithetical 
pairs, so-called because one conceptual term is opposed to another; after the concepts 
are hierarchized, philosophical pairs are formed, in which Term II is presented as a norm 
before Term I, then qualified as illusory, erroneous, apparent.4
The rhetorical analysis will allow us to identify Dewey and Pirro’s discursive 
landmarks, without this implying reducing the ideas of one to ideas of the other.5 Our aim 
is to highlight aspects that are common to both, without neglecting any differences. The 
last section of this work will be articulated in response to the identification of a sensitive 
divergence between the two thinkers, which will require examining a philosophical 
movement prior to Pyrrhonism, the sophistry, represented by Protagoras of Abdera (490-
421 B.C.). In line with contemporary interpretations of the Sophist movement, we will 
qualify the Deweyan conceptions as belonging to a tradition of thinking, in which the 
proposal for a rhetorical pedagogy is developed.
4- About this topic, see chapter IV of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2002).
5- Silva (2013) calls discursive framework a characteristic way of approaching and solving philosophical problems, a typical way of 
organizing discourse.
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John Dewey in the spotlight
John Dewey’s ideas have been the subject of controversy in Brazil since the 1930s, 
at least, when the conceptions of the New School movement spread. The debate goes 
beyond the pedagogical scope, focusing on the philosophical bases of the Deweyan 
thinking, which are part of the movement called Pragmatism, of which Dewey was one 
of the founders along with C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) and W. James (1842-1910). The first 
negative appraisals of the New School and, in particular, of Deweyan philosophy arose 
between the 1930s and 1950s through Catholic intellectuals, the main opponents of that 
movement (CUNHA; COSTA, 2006).
Several authors contributed to spread the thesis that the new pedagogy was without 
ends, being a set of educational procedures not always proven in practice. This appreciation 
indicated that the new pedagogical ideology had harmful consequences, not only in the 
school sphere, but also in the broader social sphere (COSTA, 2005). In this interpretative 
line, Dewey appears as incapable of providing solid moral principles, being responsible for 
emptying the educational process (CUNHA; COSTA, 2006).6
Currently, it is possible to find evaluations that credit to Deweyan pragmatism the 
direct or indirect responsibility for the devaluation of educational theories and for the 
exchange of theoretical certainties widely established by mere practicalism. Libâneo (1996, 
p. 112) suggests that the origin of the problem lies in the disfigurement of the proposal 
for a “unitary” pedagogical science and in the incentive to replace the philosophy of 
education with a shallow scientist view. Authors involved in criticizing the educational 
implications of the “neoliberal model of society”, such as Saviani (1997, 1980) and Duarte 
(2000, 2001), believe that the proposals of the New School and Dewey’s influence opened 
the way for a spontaneous-based pedagogy, and children should discover the world on 
their own.
Saviani (1996, p. 176-177) characterizes the pragmatist educational philosophy as 
a movement that governs the educational process in an “unreadable” way, since it is 
permeated by a certain “mistrust in reason”. By adopting experimental bases, instead of 
establishing the “essential unity between theory and practice”, the referred philosophy 
would contain the potential dissolution of “theory in practice”. Among the causes of the 
“retreat of theories” in view of the value of practices and experiences centered on the 
individual, Moraes (2003b, p. 153) situates the pragmatist conception as a propeller of 
“knowing how to do”, by classifying the theories as a “waste of time or metaphysical 
speculation”.
Several similar positions, both within and outside the area of  education, could 
be mentioned as representative of questions about the Deweyan thinking. An equally 
significant volume of evaluations follows another direction, arguing that Dewey’s 
philosophical conceptions, as well as his contributions to educational renewal, correspond 
to a valuable moral undertaking and that, having to delve into the author’s political 
6- In the 1950s, the Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagógicos published several articles in which Dewey appears associated with a spontaneous 
pedagogy, contrary to the planning of the teaching work (CUNHA, 1999b, p. 51).
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reflections, with special attention to the ethics implications inherent to their notion of 
democracy (JOHNSTON, 2006; PAPPAS, 2008).
From the set of favorable analyzes, we highlight Hansen (2007, p. 25-26) for whom 
the education proposed by Dewey concerns “moral knowledge” that encompasses “a 
feeling of justice, freedom and virtue” that underlies academic knowledge in the “lasting 
feeling of its consequences for human life”. The Deweyan work encourages the learning 
of “all contacts in life”, which is understood as a “moral life” achieved through the “art 
of democracy” (HANSEN, 2006, p. 184-185). Dewey inspires a “teaching poetics”, which 
instrumentality consists in recognizing, in “epistemic, moral and aesthetic terms”, the 
value of metaphors for the enrichment of research and educational work (HANSEN, 2005, 
p. 107). Education becomes a process with no “final and unwavering definition”, sharing 
a continuous search for the truth (p. 123).
According to this understanding, Deweyan elaborations do not lead to a split between 
education and moral formation (CUNHA, 2001a). On the contrary, they encourage the 
construction of new means to transmit values  and knowledge, promote the dissemination of 
socially accumulated experience and integrate individuals into the democratic community 
(CUNHA, 2005). Dewey does not deny the existence of “world regulatory principles”, but 
considers them dependent on “social circumstances and associative experiences”, which 
makes the affirmation of immutable values inconceivable (CUNHA, 2008, p. 175). To 
Dewey, there are normative principles, but they cannot be definitively ensured, as reality 
is in “permanent movement” (CUNHA, 2001a, p. 97). In this changing environment, the 
truth is always a provisional response to the search for moral and ethical criteria and 
values  (CUNHA, 1999a, p. 83).
The most complete expression of positions unfavorable to the New School and 
contemporary pedagogy, as well as in relation to Dewey, is found in Moraes (2003b, p. 
154), to whom the heart of the problem lies in the acceptance of an “epistemological 
skepticism” which, widely disseminated, causes the “theoretical degradation” that is 
observed today: a “practice without reflection”. Prevails a way of thinking that “rules out 
the need to inquire about truth, objectivity or what would be a correct interpretation or 
apprehension of reality” (MORAES, 2003a, p. 174).
To characterize Dewey as a skeptical philosopher is not surprising, considering 
that, as Pappas (2008, p. 6) points out, Pragmatism is usually seen as disconnected from 
normative ethical principles, receiving denominations such as “ethical skepticism” and 
“ethical relativism”. Such a characterization does not imply a negative judgment of the 
Deweyan theses, since, to Dewey, knowledge does not, in fact, require “transcendental 
truths”, once “convincing or probable truths” are established; the mind is not an “instance 
of representation of the real, like a faithful mirror of the world”, but a source of provisional 
certainties that enable effective actions based on “beliefs about the real”, which is sufficient 
to plan “the change of the current order” (p. 56).
Following this line of analysis, Deweyan skepticism would not be responsible for 
disorders, but a wealth of healthy innovations; instead of losses, bewilderments and 
insecurity, we would have a new and promising way of defining education, understanding 
that educational purposes do not need a definitive and immutable plan, since we can 
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discuss them by consensus during the investigation itself, without resulting in the 
impoverishment of agents and school content. Indispensable for this process to happen is 
the existence of a truly democratic environment, the only one that allows and generously 
welcomes divergence (CUNHA, 2006; CUNHA, 2008).
Dewey and the search for certainty
The suggestion of associating Dewey with skepticism requires an accurate 
investigation of his works, of which we highlight The quest for certainty (DEWEY, 1929), 
a work that fits the theme now examined because it was elaborated with the purpose 
of “refuting the philosophical search for certainty ”, considering that “no thing, end or 
essence is eternal, immutable or necessary” (GARRISON, 2006, p. 19).
A central feature of the Deweyan philosophy is the strong opposition to conceptions 
that seek to be grounded in something that is supposed to precede existence. Contrary 
to the movements of thinking that claim that there is a sphere of the real composed of 
essences transcendent to existential relations, with which we can reach ultimate and 
unequivocal truths, Dewey argues that the objects we want to know are examined in the 
field of relationships built by men in their practices, which are the result of intelligently 
directed operations and can be evaluated by their results.
In The quest for certainty, the defense of this thesis involves proposing that 
the investigative method of experimental sciences be expanded to the field of moral 
judgments, which implies a profound change in the criteria we use to understand moral 
and evaluative knowledge. Dewey (1929, p. 313) affirms that it is necessary to reflect on 
“needs congruent with the present life” and “to interpret the conclusions of science in 
relation to their consequences on our beliefs regarding purposes and values”.7
The argumentative axis of The quest for certainty is the defense of the instrumental 
function of philosophy in the search for solutions to human problems. Dewey (1929, p. 
24) sees philosophical thinking as decisive in the “construction of the good”, which is 
achieved through reflection on the problems of humanity, reconciling “the conclusions of 
natural science with the objective validity of the values by which men live and regulate 
their conduct”. It is up to Philosophy to examine the current conditions of science and 
life, to investigate the criteria, judgments and beliefs that “direct our conduct” (p. 67). 
And to develop a “system of operative ideas congruous with present knowledge and with 
present facilities of control over natural events”, to promote the “adjustment between 
the conclusions of natural science and the beliefs and values  that have authority in the 
direction of life” (p . 284).
The proposition that the method of science is useful in the moral field is supported 
by the rejection of the dichotomy between knowledge and action, in defense of the 
fact that theoretical values cannot be separated from practical values. Philosophy must 
renounce this dualism in order to make possible the “interaction of our cognitive beliefs”, 
7 - The same idea can be found in Democracy and education, from 1916, a work in which science is seen as the main resource to improve our 
means of action, and education must use it to change our “attitude of imagination and feeling” (DEWEY, 1959a, p. 246).
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which rest upon “the most dependable methods of inquiry”, and “our practical beliefs 
about the values” (DEWEY, 1929, p. 36-37).8 All of our beliefs are derived from scientific 
investigation, whether they are about the nature and the “actual structure and processes 
of things”, or about the values  that rule our conduct (p. 19). What Dewey (p. 48) wants is 
a balance between science and values, believing that “authentic beliefs about existence 
as they currently exist can operate fruitfully and efficaciously in connection with the 
practical problems”.9
Deweyan pragmatism is opposed to dualistic philosophies that seek in “antecedent 
Being” the “properties which alone have authority over the formation of our judgments 
of value that is, of the ends and purposes”, to which we attribute the power to guide our 
“intellectual, social, moral, religious, aesthetic” conduct (DEWEY, 1929, p. 69). Valuation 
judgments must result from “reflective investigation” (p. 262); they are tested and reviewed 
by “intelligent action” (p. 299); “intelligently directed action” is the appropriate means 
for the search for moral knowledge (p. 30); only the “instruments and doings of directed 
practice” allow the natural sciences to be brought into line with human purposes (p. 85).10
Examining Dewey’s discourse with the resources of rhetorical analysis, we note that 
the author articulates his reasoning through a notional dissociation, whose antithetical pair 
is formed by the terms Essence and Existence. When ranked, Essence appears as Term 
I, and Existence, as Term II. This philosophical pair expresses the author’s disagreement 
with the notion of knowledge as the essence or property of things, in favor of the notion 
of knowledge as “ulterior return to existential operations” (DEWEY, 1929, p. 159). Dewey 
(p. 200) describes “the known objects” as “consequences of directed operations”, not as 
results of “something antecedent”. Thus, knowledge is a “constructed, existentially produced 
object” (p. 211); its foundation is in “existential interactions” (p. 265); its validity is “tested 
by results and not by correspondence with antecedent properties of existence” (p. 146).
In The quest for certainty, other notions are added to Terms I (Essence) and II 
(Existence) of the already formed pair. Absolute (Term I) and Probable (Term II) characterize 
the reasoning that states that there are no indisputable values, only probable values, 
socially constructed and dependent on human actions (DEWEY, 1929, p. 194). We can 
never be sure of the effects of the expansion of the empirical method in the field of 
human actions: the “direct and original experience of things liked and enjoyed” are just 
“possibilities of values to be achieved” (p. 259).
The subjection of the Absolute to the Probable is also present in the experimental 
sciences and in the humanities. To Dewey (1929, p. 277), every belief has a “rehearsal 
character” and is therefore “hypothetical”, but it is necessary to observe that a 
moral law is similar to a “law of physics”, being nothing more than a “formula” 
that expresses how we respond to given “specific conditions” (p. 278). Knowledge 
produced by science is susceptible to revisions and continuous investigation, being 
possible to adopt the same parameters in any type of operation dedicated to solving 
problems, including those concerning moral values, because doubt, uncertainty, the 
8- About Dewey’s belief and knowledge, see Amaral (2007).
9- About Dewey’s method and democracy, see Amaral (2007) and Cunha (1999a, 2001b).
1�- In a 1903 essay, Dewey (2009) also advocates the connection between moral judgments and scientific method. On this topic, see Pappas (2008).
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formulation of hypotheses and the dynamic relationship between thinking and action 
characterize all investigative processes.11
Dewey (1929, p. 189) argues that all research provides probable knowledge for 
containing, in addition to theoretical elements, practical components involved in constantly 
changing problematic situations. As every investigation starts from a questioning situation, 
the degree of knowledge obtained resides in the possible relationships of an object in 
such situations. No investigation provides “complete security” because to investigate is to 
address “unique”, “relative” and “uncertain” situations, in which the element of change is 
recurrent (p. 7). Every investigation involves “overt doing” affected by “definite changes 
in the environment or in our relation to it”, which makes only probabilities possible, never 
absolute certainties (p. 86). The investigation provides only “indications, evidence and 
signs”, whose character is “intermediate, not ultimate” (p. 99).
Cunha (2001b, p. 89) explains that the notion of change is recurrent in Dewey’s 
discourse, being always used to “characterize the open, varied and unstable universe” of 
the scientific practices that “inspire the new philosophical attitude” proposed. In The quest 
for certainty, the constitution of the philosophical pair Permanence (Term I) and Change 
(Term II) is evident, since Dewey (1929, p. 274) finds in the transformation of the world 
the uncertain bases of all investigation: science, he says, it is “knowledge of the relations 
between changes which enable us to connect things as antecedents and consequences”.12
Dewey (1929, p. 3) does not intend to undermine the certainty of “a kingdom of 
order, justice”, as he admits that the main reason for scientific practices is to obtain safe 
values in life. Its difference from traditional philosophical movements is in not aiming for 
“absolute certainty”, a “complete system of immutable and necessary truth”, but putting 
certainty in the field of the possible, privileging the examination of the assumptions 
that ensure a probable degree of knowledge (p. 16). Uncertainty and, consequently, 
questionability are intrinsic to Dewey’s theory of knowledge, in which the search for 
knowledge is a “problem that never ends”, because when one problematic situation is 
resolved, another takes its place, replacing the uncertain nature of knowledge (p. 296).
The notional dissociation that results in the pair composed of Permanence (Term I) 
and Change (Term II) reflects the statement made by Dewey (1929, p. 193-194) that “there 
is no knowledge self-guaranteed to be infallible”, because “all knowledge is the product 
of special acts of inquiry”, and the investigation deals with changing practical situations. 
No investigation has a “knowledge monopoly” (p. 22). This is because, as Dewey (1959b, 
p. 129-130) analyzes in Reconstruction in philosophy, to investigate is  “rationalizing 
the possibilities of experience”. Intelligence is not in obtaining “first and indemonstrable 
truths”, but in “the ability to estimate the possibilities of a situation and act according to 
its estimate” (DUTRA, 1929, p. 213).13
11- This idea is also found in Democracy and education: thinking must be tested, experienced, so that one can never “cover with perfect accuracy 
all the consequences” (DEWEY, 1959a, p. 165).
12- This same pair can be found in Reconstruction in philosophy, from 1920: “change, rather than fixity”, is the “measure of ‘reality’ or energy of 
being”; knowledge is a “correlation of changes”, an “ability to detect one change occurring in correspondence with another” (DEWEY, 1959b, p. 86-87).
13- In The quest for certainty, Dewey uses the developments of quantum mechanics to affirm that science, even fallible, produces knowledge 
(COSTA-LOPES; CUNHA, 2011).
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These positions can be characterized as fallibilists, a term that expresses a way of 
seeing the world that privileges questionable and revisable aspects of existence, indicating 
the insufficiency of our knowledge (DUTRA, 2005, p. 77). This view of the world goes 
against foundational movements, so called because they seek to ensure the unquestionable 
character of knowledge, “an unwavering starting point in the consideration of philosophical 
issues, knowledge and human conduct” (p. 13).
Dewey rejects the foundationalist tradition that claims that there is knowledge only 
where there are “true and justified beliefs”, ideas “with a truth we can show beyond any 
doubt” (DUTRA, 2000, p. 31). Dewey differs from those who seek “self-evident truths, 
with which an unassailable base could be conferred on all human knowledge” (DUTRA, 
2005, p. 78). In the Deweyan view, science does not indicate a path “full of certainty and 
infallible strategies, linear and previously determinable”, but a roadmap of possibilities 
that are drawn “within an unstable universe, in which knowledge is provisional” (CUNHA, 
2004 , p. 118).
Pyrrho and the search for truth
Dutra (2005, p. 13) explains that at the beginning of modernity, in direct opposition 
to the foundational movements, the philosophical field was conceived as “the object of 
fallible and incomplete theories”. Porchat Pereira (2007, p. 81) adds that Pyrrhonism was 
decisive in the “creation of the intellectual atmosphere” that made modern Philosophy 
viable. Popkin (2000) recalls that the problem of knowledge was established in the 16th 
century, due to the rediscovery of the writings of Sextus Empiricus, whose questioning 
impelled the Protestant Reformation. The criteria of the Church were contested by the 
reformers, raising uncertainties about the correct standard for understanding the truths of 
religion, and this favored the resumption of the problem specific to the Pyrrhonians, the 
discussion about the truth.
In the Renaissance era, it was Montaigne (1533-1592) who most revered Sextus’ 
Pyrrhonian elaborations, affirming that the examination of sensitive experience, the basis 
of all knowledge, reveals that none of our points of view is endowed with certainty or 
reliable foundation, reason whereby the “only way is to follow the old Pyrrhonism and 
suspend judgment” (POPKIN, 2000, p. 103). Although opponents of these ideas have made 
respectable attempts to dismantle or soften Pyrrhonism, this philosophical movement 
projected its influence over the centuries to come, being shaped by different theorists and 
assuming different connotations.
Deweyan fallibilism may have been influenced by this historically recent movement, 
but it should be noted that the dubious attitude that emerges in the early days of modernity 
was preceded, if not inspired by the formulations of Pyrrho of Elis, a thinker of the 
Hellenistic era responsible for creating the discursive framework which gave rise to all 
later forms of skepticism. To conclude whether Dewey’s fallibilism has anything to do 
with Pyrrho, we must ask whether the philosophical pairs identified in Dewey’s discourse 
are present in Pyrrhean formulations.
The answer comes from Sextus Empiricus (1997, p. 115) who systematizes pyrrhonian 
ideas and opposes them to dogmatics and academics, representatives of trends of thinking 
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who were also concerned with the theme of truth. Dogmatists are classified as those who 
claim to have discovered the truth, while academics prescribe that the truth cannot be 
apprehended because the impressions coming from the sensory organs are not reliable. 
For Sextus, only the Pyrrhonians are interested in continuing the search for certainty.
Pyrrhonism is identified with the etymology of the word skepticism, skeptikói, 
derived from the Greek term sképtomai, “those who observe”, who “examine” (PORCHAT 
PEREIRA, 2007, p. 296). Pyrrho’s followers, particularly Sextus, gave skepticism the 
connotation of “continuous and tireless investigation” (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2007, p. 42). 
Because they do not even support the veracity of their own formulations and because they 
do not claim to be “capable of definitively establishing any point”, the Pyrrhonians present 
themselves as those who develop “permanent philosophical research”, an attitude that 
derives the zetetic denomination - from zetein, to inquire, to have doubts, to investigate - 
with what they call their own school (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2007, p. 77).
In the characterization of Pyrrhonian skepticism made by Sextus, it is evident the 
presence of the Essence/Existence pair that we identified in the Deweyan discourse. The 
Pyrrhonian attitude does not agree with those who express a “definitive knowledge” about 
something “not evident”, as if they had certainties supported by definitive formulations 
about the real, as Porchat Pereira (2007, p. 224) says, nor with those who, because they 
do not trust the data obtained through the senses, they claim that there is no “guaranteed 
standard for determining which of our judgments are true and which are false” (POPKIN, 
2000, p. 13). Pyrrhonians reject both the search for the Essence of things to unravel its 
internal structure, supposedly hidden in its true being, and the categorical denial of the 
truth, due to the impossibility of apprehending it; they prefer to remain within the limits 
of phenomenal manifestation (VERDAN, 1998).
Pyrrhonian doubt is not a means to elucidate what is supposedly hidden on the 
plan of Essence, above Existence; its purpose is to promote the debate on the “human 
discourse that is proposed as an interpretation of the phenomenal appearance and as the 
unveiling of the internal discourse of the object” with the intention of manifesting “the 
being beyond appearing” (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2007, p. 93).14 Pyrrhonism maintains the 
desire to find the truth, without ever abandoning the dubious attitude (DUTRA, 1997, 
p. 46-47). The Pyrrhonian can simulate dogmatism and elaborate theories, but always 
suspends judgment to keep his/her beliefs as hypotheses. In this guideline, the presence 
of the Absolute/Probable Deweyan pair is noted, as hypotheses are formulations that are 
submitted to proof, elaborated so that we can investigate their value.
Dutra (1993, p. 51) analyzes that the central objective of the philosopher of permanent 
investigation is to continue “his attempts to re-elaborate doctrines and investigate against 
them without being accused of proceeding irrationally”. Hypotheses are something that 
can be affirmed only in the plan of the Probable, not of the Absolute, and for that 
reason we can pyrrhonically “investigate against them, that is, put them to the test”. What 
distances the skeptic from the dogmatic is that the latter petrifies knowledge when the 
research work is terminated at some point, refraining from proceeding with the “perennial 
examination of hypotheses” (DUTRA, 1997, p. 55-56).
14- All italics inside quotation marks are from the works cited.
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If it is relatively easy to locate the Essence/Existence and Absolute/Probable 
philosophical pairs in Pyrrhonism, the same cannot be said about Permanence/Change, 
which is equally relevant in Deweyan discourse, as Pyrrho’s purpose does not seem to 
coincide with Dewey’s. Let us see how Sextus Empiricus (1997, p. 120-121) exposes the 
process that takes the Pyrrhonian to the position that characterizes it as such: initially the 
skeptic philosophizes to deliberate on the truth or falsity of what comes to him/her through 
the senses and, thus, to be able to achieve “tranquility”, ataraxia, which naturally comes 
from the conclusion of this philosophizing; along this path, faces insoluble controversies 
and chooses to suspend judgment, epoché, which ends up putting him/her in the initially 
desired state, tranquility. Sextus Empiricus (1997, p. 121) concludes by saying that skeptics 
“do not determine whether things are good or bad, do not avoid them or seek them avidly, 
and, therefore, are not disturbed”.
It is evident that the highest objective of the Pyrrhonian attitude is to reach a 
state of non-disturbance, tranquility, which suggests passivity, not commitment to the 
occurrences of the phenomenal world. Skeptics live “according to the norms of ordinary 
life”, since they cannot be “totally inactive”; they are “capable of perception and thinking”, 
they are taken to eat and drink due to the “necessary character of the sensations”. Their 
behavior is governed by laws and customs dictated by tradition, which is why they 
consider mercifulness a good thing, and wickedness a bad thing (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 
1997, p. 120). Not judging on things, their attitude is one of inertia in the face of the 
phenomenon; not being able to react even in the face of inequities, they are prevented 
from acting in favor of the transformation of the world.
This description shows the distance that separates the Deweyan discursive framework 
from the Pyrrhonian, since Dewey’s philosophy is clearly based on inciting action, 
aiming at leading his audience to adopt behaviors that transform the social order. This, 
incidentally, is the aim of the discourse elaborated by the American philosopher in favor 
of educational renewal, as can be read in Democracy and education (DEWEY, 1959a), his 
most relevant work on the subject. Its intention is to awaken in people the desire - which 
must be converted into action - for a more balanced society in the future (CUNHA, 2001c; 
CUNHA, 2016). This is the meaning of the Dewey Permanence/Change pair, and nothing 
sounds stranger to Dewey’s purposes than Pyrrhonian ataraxia, the intended exemption 
from judgment before the facts of existence.
In search of a new pedagogy
The core of the distance between Dewey and Pyrrho is in the commitment to the 
transformation of the world, an attitude assumed by the first and replaced, in the second, 
by the search for tranquility. Their discursive milestones come close because they reject 
the expectation of finding certainty and truth in the sphere that supposedly houses the 
essence of things and absolute judgments, opting for the endless investigation of the 
phenomena of existence to achieve probable statements; but it is only Dewey who sustains 
this position when he conceives that the world is a reality in constant change, impossible 
to be grasped by a philosophy of permanence.
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In this respect, Dewey is familiar with another ancient philosophical movement, 
the sophistry, from which the Pyrrhonians inherited the refusal of dogmatism, but not the 
possibility of establishing, through discourse, logos, what things are (MAZZOTTI, 2008; 
SCHIAPPA, 2003). Pyrrho’s dubious attitude stems from the sophistical way of arguing, 
called antilogic, which consists of opposing one logos to another in order to “discover 
or draw attention to the presence of an opposition in an argument, or in a thing or 
situation” (KERDERD, 2003, p. 109). But Protagoras does not deny the truth; his well-
known formulation “what seems true to anyone is true for him to whom it seems so” 
means only that we cannot refer to the truth in absolute terms, but we have the means to 
support “particular truths”; opinions differ, but, through rhetoric, we can always “make 
the previously weaker reason stronger” (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2007, p. 14).
Sophistry was a response to the transformations that took place in the Greek world 
between the years 450 and 400 B.C., when Athens experienced a moment of profound 
criticism of current values and beliefs. The positioning of man at the center of social life 
changed the meaning of the philosophical thinking hitherto produced, the goal of which was 
to investigate the initial principle, the arché of all things; instead of a philosophy focused 
on Essence, the sophists proposed to understand the concrete existence of the citizen in 
that political environment. Instead of being guided by what exists by nature, physei, the 
sophistical movement promoted the debate on what is established by convention, nomos, 
privileging to discuss deliberation processes, particularly those that affect the collectivity. 
No longer the truth inhabiting the Absolute plan, referenced in the myth; what counts 
now is man’s action before what is merely Probable, which changes as the circumstances 
of life in society change (SILVA; CUNHA, 2015, p. 71).
In the sophistical reflections, therefore, all the philosophical pairs that we identified 
in the Deweyan discourse are found - Essence/Existence, Absolute/Probable and 
Permanence/Change -, being the first and second also present in the Pyrrhonian thinking. 
If Deweyan educational propositions can be seen as skeptical, as we said at the beginning 
of this work, it should be added now that they can, with even more reason, also be called 
sophistical. In our first section, we tried to show that such propositions, even if they can 
be classified as skeptical, do not necessarily lead to school disorder. Situating Dewey in 
this other philosophical record, we can add that the uncertainty in the field of education 
may mean not disorder, but the search for a new pedagogy, since the purpose of the 
sophist movement was precisely to present a new way of educating man. The sophist 
paideia aimed at the “total man”, the one who serves the city by assuming transformative 
practices, which requires an educational conception capable of covering both the physical 
and emotional components of the student (SILVA; CUNHA, 2015, p. 74).
The education proposed by the sophists and by Dewey has been updated in order 
to compose a pedagogy radically contrary to the dominant trend in contemporary 
education. This update can contribute to broaden the critical reflections developed by 
several researchers, such as Biesta (2013, p. 37-38), who sees the current educational 
guidelines as having a “language of learning” that describes the educational situation as a 
simple transaction; “the learner is the (potential) consumer”, a carrier of needs, while “the 
teacher, the educator or the educational institution are seen as the provider, that is, the 
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one who exists to satisfy the needs of the learner”. Education is today “a commodity – a 
‘thing’- to be provided or delivered by the teacher or educational institution, and to be 
consumed by the learner”. But education cannot be reduced to the economic dimension 
because the educational contents and objectives are fundamentally political, not a matter 
to be considered within the scope of individual preferences or needs, apart from the 
collectivity. The language of learning makes it difficult to formulate questions that are 
beyond the client’s personal sphere or the market, which makes “democratic deliberation 
about education goals” unfeasible (p. 43).15
The authors favorable to Dewey, seen in the first section of this paper, believe 
that the Deweyan propositions foster the ethical and aesthetic dimension of the work 
of educating, as opposed to theories that prioritize measurable results and conduct that, 
emulating the functioning of the market, make education analogous to a contract between 
sellers and buyers. The criticism of this trend allows the emergence of innovative practical 
contributions to school work based on Dewey, and inspires to give the name of poetic 
pedagogy to Dewey’s educational philosophy (CUNHA, 2010; CUNHA; PIMENTA, 2011).16 
The word poetic comes from the Greek poiesis, denoting that the teaching profession is 
comparable to the work of the poet, the one who is responsible for creating something, 
articulating means to bring into existence what does not present itself as such (GARRISON, 
2010, p. 8). Based on Dewey, Garrison (2010, p. 73) affirms that teachers bring the good of 
their students into existence, being necessary, for this, to be able to bring their own good 
into existence, that they become capable of creating in themselves the skills and values 
concerning a “practical wisdom”, phrónesis, which combines know how to do it with the 
moral disposition to do good.
Teaching is an art, techné, which transcends the limits imposed by the current 
market environment. The maximum value of teaching is individuality, in the radical sense 
of the term, involving the manifestation of desires and knowledge of the teacher and 
the student and the search for attuning them to the goal of changing social reality. It 
is a process that is not apprehended through quantitative analysis tools, although such 
resources are useful for organizing certain school practices.
The familiarity between Dewey and the sophists suggests another name for the 
Deweyan propositions, in addition to poetic pedagogy. Crick (2010, 2015a) uses rhetorical 
pedagogy to describe the educational approach that employs the radicalism of the Dewey 
conception of democracy in order to totally involve the individual in releasing his/her 
impulses, aiming to develop the potential to deliberate and act intelligently. In Deweyan 
political philosophy, the foundation of democracy is unconditional faith in man’s 
inclination towards communication, persuasion, intelligence-controlled discussion, the 
interactional activity that employs rationality in favor of forming consensus on topics 
15 - Vergara (2015, p. 598-599) makes a similar criticism, showing that the “episteme of modern didactics” adopts the false belief that “the 
subjects, regardless of their culture and history, must learn certain contents - skills, abilities, competencies - selected for them as valid”, in the hope 
of achieving an egalitarian and balanced society. This procedure does not admit the uncertainty and complexity of the real world, as it applies to a 
“parallel world” marked by simple and immutable certainties, the only world that accepts the intended intervention.
16-  Among practical applications, see Doddington (2014, p. 1263), who proposes teaching philosophy to children to dissolve the tension 
between students’ “creative imagination” and the rigidity of school structures. See also Farrys and Sengupta (2016), who use Deweyan aesthetic 
and democratic conceptions to support a non-mechanistic computational literacy proposal.
13Educ. Pesqui., São Paulo,  v. 46, e218071, 2020.
John Dewey: the search for a rhetoric pedagogy
of public interest. It is in the context of democratic experience that one learns to define 
means and ends and to evaluate the limits and possibilities of each person’s desires, 
through the consequences of action.
The radical nature of rhetorical pedagogy lies in the purpose of leading students 
to compose and express the power that emanates from their personal inclinations, 
not in the narrow space of individual life, but in the broad horizon of collectivity, in 
which there are controversies that demand debate between competing theses. Mental 
activity, as Dewey defines it, is not just used to build or deconstruct values related to 
individuality; individuality being built in the sphere of experience, and being the social 
experience, the work of the mind consists of creating and recreating innovative and 
intelligent habits and methods designed to project the individual into the public space 
of deliberation and action.
Such conceptualizations regarding rhetorical pedagogy result from a review of the 
legacy left by the sophists for philosophy and education. Until recently, the pejorative view 
from Platonism regarding this legacy prevailed, but new interpretations have updated this 
theme, showing sophistry as a set of educational principles and procedures aimed at the 
education of man for a democratic society (SILVA; CUNHA, 2015). Crick (2015b, p. 9) 
characterizes rhetoric not as a simple tool of persuasion in the service of political purposes 
beyond ethical appraisals, but as a “means of constitution, resistance and transformation 
of power”, because what characterizes it is “construction and dissemination of symbolic 
forms” that aim to make the feeling of “shared humanity” effective.
Final considerations
In The name of the rose, one of Umberto Eco’s characters (1986, p. 330) suggests 
that “not infrequently, books speak of books: it is as if they spoke among themselves”. 
The library that occupies the center of the novel’s plot would then be “the place of a 
long, centuries-old murmuring, an imperceptible dialogue between one parchment and 
another”. This image mirrors the method adopted in the investigation now concluded: we 
assume that authors and books located in different times and places dialogue with each 
other, and our task as researchers is to challenge the obstacle imposed by time and by 
different forms of discourse.
This work sought to place a contemporary author, John Dewey, in dialogue with 
ancient philosophers, characterizing them as belonging to a historically demarcated 
tradition of thought, the rhetorical tradition. Sophists occupy the starting point, and 
Dewey, the highest point in this tradition. This method of analysis requires some caution, 
since the researched discourses were constructed in very different contexts, and one 
cannot inadvertently compare a proposition that responds to problems of the ancient era 
with propositions formulated in the 20th century.
We do not intend to organize a taxonomy to group the philosophers and thinkers of 
education, but we cannot deny the usefulness of methods established by other sciences, 
as long as they are properly adjusted to our field of investigation. When we identify 
argumentative strategies that make up discursive frameworks in scenarios of extensive 
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diversity and temporal variety, we do not expect to find a full identity; what we are 
looking for are homologies in the midst of differences, coincidences that can be attributed 
to a common ancestry - in this case, the sophistry -, understanding the particularities as 
a result of the multiplicity of historical contexts.
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